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Abstract This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random
matching when interaction occurs in groups of n ≥ 2 individuals using pure strate-
gies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of
individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strat-
egy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially
depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching
rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and
show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform
random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we
derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show
that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to
average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly
studied normal-form games.
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1 Introduction
The canonical evolutionary game theory model of Maynard Smith and Price (1973)
plays an important role in biology, economics, political science, and other fields. Its
equilibrium concept, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) describes evolutionary
outcomes in environments where populations are large and matching is uniformly
random.1 Since an ESS is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, it obviously cannot
explain any behavioral departure from purely self-serving behavior in the one-shot
Nash sense. In particular it cannot account for cooperative behavior in say, a prisoners’
dilemma, or shed light on altruism more generally, nor can it account for any other
non-Nash behaviors such as spite (Hamilton 1970; Alger and Weibull 2012) or costly
punishment (Fehr and Gächter 2000).
In order to explain such deviations from Nash behavior, evolutionary game theory
turned to models with a finite number of agents hence departing from the first of the
mentioned conditions of Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Thus in Schaffer (1988),
the finite set of individuals have “market power” and can influence average fitness
while making simultaneous decisions (playing the field). In the model preferred by
Maynard Smith (1982)—namely repeated games—a few agents, usually just two, can
perfectly monitor and record each others’ past actions and condition their strategies
hereupon (in evolutionary theory, the repeated games approach is usually referred to
as direct reciprocity). Both of these frameworks have led to a large body of research
in economics and game theory (see e.g. Alós-Ferrer and Ania 2005; Leininger 2006;
Samuelson 2002; Vega-Redondo 1997, and references therein).
Others, beginning with Wright (1921, 1922) and his F-statistic, focused on studying
populations where individuals do not get matched in a uniformly random manner.
When matching is non-uniformly random the fitness of an individual will depend on
the group of individuals he is matched with, and groups with different compositions
will on average meet with varying reproductive success (Kerr and Godfrey-Smith
2002); see also Bergström (2002). Take the prisoners’ dilemma. If cooperators have
a higher chance compared to defectors to be matched with cooperators, matching is
non-uniformly random, and specifically it is in this case assortative. If the matching
is assortative enough, cooperators will end up receiving a higher average fitness than
defectors and thus positive levels of cooperation can become evolutionarily stable.
Assortative matching has also been shown to lead to more cooperative outcomes in
Moran processes (Cooney et al. 2016).2
Non-uniformly random matching is a realistic description in situations where a large
group of individuals cannot perfectly monitor each others’ past behaviors but receive
1 Intuitively, uniformly random matching means that an individuals’ type has no influence on what type of
individual he is likely to be matched to.
2 For an overview see Rousset (2004). For a survey of more recent advances in the social sciences, see
Newton (2018, Sect. 3).
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some signals about opponents’ types and exert some influence on the matching process
(Wilson and Dugatkin 1997; Bergström 2003). It can also result due to prolonged
interaction of individuals in separated groups (Maynard Smith 1964), if individuals
are matched according to a “meritocratic matching” process in the sense of Nax et al.
(2014), if matching depends on the geographical location of individuals (Eshel et al.
1998; Nowak and May 1992; Skyrms 2004), or if (genetically) similar individuals
match assortatively as in models of kin selection (Hamilton 1964; Grafen 1979; Hines
and Maynard Smith 1979; Alger and Weibull 2010; Ohtsuki 2010). Several other
processes are listed in Bergström (2013) who also shows that the index of assortativity
of Bergström (2003) and Wright’s F-statistic are formally equivalent. In general, the
above conditions lead to what biologists refer to as structured populations.3
Now, the existing literature on non-uniformly random matching usually deals with
special cases—the typical being the two-player, two-strategy case where matching
is assortative. Exceptions to this include Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002) who study
many-player games with two strategies, van Veelen (2011) who uses a setting similar
to ours and discusses inclusive fitness, and Alger and Weibull (2016) who develop a
general model to investigate the evolutionary stability of preferences. Here we consider
the general case and define Nash equilibrium and ESS within the resulting population
game (Sandholm 2010, pp. 22–23). The fitness function of the population game is
derived from two primitives: a (symmetric, normal-form game) payoff matrix and a
function that assigns particular population compositions to group compositions (called
a matching rule). Given this structure of fitness functions, we then show how several
results known from population games carry through to our setting. In particular, any
Nash equilibrium is a steady state for the replicator dynamic, any (Lyapunov) stable
steady state for the replicator dynamic is a Nash equilibrium, and any ESS is an
asymptotically stable state of the replicator dynamic.
More substantially, we push the literature forward by deriving results on the effi-
ciency of the Nash equilibria of population games. A key point—well known from
the prisoners’ dilemma—is that under uniformly random matching, Nash equilibrium
may be inefficient in the sense that the average fitness of the population is not max-
imized. Since ESS and Nash equilibrium coincide in evolutionary models based on
uniformly random matching, it follows that uniformly random matching generally
fails to produce outcomes that are efficient. When matching is non-uniformly random,
this raises the following question: If we keep the payoff structure fixed and vary the
matching rule, will some matching rule lead to efficiency? Our main result in this
regard (Proposition 3) tells us that any efficient outcome will in fact be a Nash equi-
librium under some matching rule. Such efficient outcomes could, for example, be
reached endogenously by populations who can influence the matching process.4
3 An interesting study is that of van Veelen et al. (2012) who use a model where interactions are repeated and
the population is also structured. They find that an assortative population structure significantly increases
cooperation levels.
4 Nax and Rigos (2016) show that while this is true for certain classes of games, it is not always the case.
In a similar setting, Wu (2016) studies coordination games in a stochastic setting and shows that the Pareto
dominant outcome is always stochastically stable. Studying the evolution of (other-regarding) preferences,
Newton (2017) shows that if assortativity itself is subject to evolution, Pareto inefficient behavior can be
evolutionarily stable.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the general setup,
introduces matching rules, and defines Nash equilibrium and ESS. Section 3 contains
our main theoretical results. Section 4 provides a number of applications in two-player,
two-strategy normal-form games. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Population games under matching rules
In this section we formulate the basic model as a population game under the replicator
dynamic (see Taylor and Jonker 1978, Sandholm 2010, pp. 22–23). At each point
in time there is a unit mass of individuals each of whom follows one of m ∈ N
pure strategies. The individuals are drawn into groups of size n ∈ N according to a
particular protocol which we term a matching rule and describe in detail below.5 In the
groups, individuals execute their strategies and receive payoffs (fitness) determined
by the composition of strategies in the groups they are drawn into. The average fitness
level of individuals following a given pure strategy across the groups determines the
strategy’s (overall) fitness and therefore the proportion of individuals that follow that
pure strategy at the next point in time. This leads to a dynamical system of the replicator
variety which we study in continuous time.
2.1 Groups and matching rules
Let M = {1, . . . , m} denote the set of pure strategies. An individual who follows (pure)
strategy i ∈ M is interchangeably said to be of type i or an i -type. As mentioned, n is
the (finite) group size. A group type g ∈ G ≡ {gˆ ∈ Nm : ∑i∈M gˆi = n} is a vector
that specifies a number of individuals gi of each type i = 1, . . . , m. With group size
n and m pure strategies, there are (n+m−1)!
n!(m−1)! distinct group types (see Aigner 2007, p.
15). Hence the cardinality of the set of group types G is γ ≡ (n+m−1)!
n!(m−1)! . To simplify
notation in the following define Pig = gin ∈ [0, 1], which is the fraction of individuals
in group type g that are of type i . The matrix with typical element Pig is denoted by
P ∈ Rm×γ .
The frequency distribution of different (individual) types at a moment in time is
called a population state and denoted by x ∈ m (throughout m ≡ {x ∈ Rm+ :∑m
i=1 xi = 1}). Note that the i’th element in a population state x simply is the propor-
tion of i-type individuals in the population. The frequency distribution of group types
is called a group state and denoted z ∈ γ with zg the proportion of groups of type
g. A matching rule is a function that maps population states into group states.
Definition 1 (Matching Rule) A matching rule is a function f : m → γ such that
xi =
∑
g∈G
Pig fg(x) for all i ∈ M (1)
5 Our notion of a matching rule generalizes what Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002, p. 484) call a “rule of
group assembly” to more than 2 pure strategies (the concept is also related to Bergström 2003, as returned
to below).
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or, more concisely,
x = P f (x). (2)
Note that Pig fg(x) is the fraction of the (total) population that is of type i and
is allocated into a g-type group under the matching rule f . So (1) (or equivalently,
(2)), ensures that the fraction of i-type individuals allocated into the different groups
equals the fraction xi of i-type individuals that are actually present in the population.
This of course is an entirely natural consistency requirement given our interpretation
of matching rules as mappings that allocate individuals into groups.
Let wig denote the fraction of i-type individuals that is allocated to a g-type group.
It is easily seen that,
wig(x) = Pig fg(x)
xi
, (3)
where of course xi > 0 must hold (otherwise there would be no individuals of type
i in the first place). Note that wig(x) (also) may be interpreted as the probability that
an individual of type i is drawn into a group of type g.
2.2 Payoffs and equilibrium
Having described how agents are allocated into groups by means of a matching rule
f , we now formulate the interaction as a population game (see Sandholm 2010, pp.
22–23 for example). Recall from the beginning of Sect. 2.1, that a group type g is a
vector that specifies how many individuals of each of the m types reside in the group.
Within each group individuals receive payoff according to a symmetric normal-form
game. In such games the payoff of each player depends only on the strategy he follows
and the number of other players that follow each of the m strategies (as opposed to
who uses each strategy). The game is represented by a matrix A ∈ Rn×γ . Its typical
entry Aig ∈ R is interpreted as the payoff a type i individual receives upon executing
his strategy in group type g.6
Since Aig is the payoff to an individual of type i in group type g and wig(x) is
the probability that an i-type individual ends up in a group type g (see the paragraph
following Definition 1), the (ex-ante) population-wide expected payoff/fitness to an
i-type individual when the population state is x (and xi > 0) equals
Fi (x) =
∑
g∈G
wig(x)Aig . (4)
This defines fitness functions Fi : int (m) → R, that are the coordinate functions of
F : int (m) → Rm .
We extend the definition of F to include the boundary of m by setting wig(x) =
limx˜i ↓0 Pig fg(x˜)/x˜i whenever x ∈ bdi (m).7 We will assume that the matching rule
6 Of course, some of the entries in this matrix are meaningless—for example the payoff to an individual of
type i when he is found in a group in which all members are of type j = i—but this will create no problems
in what follows.
7 We define bdi (m ) ≡ {x ∈ m : xi = 0}.
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f is such that F can be extended to a Lipschitz continuous function on m . Now notice
that under condition (1), if Pig > 0 (equivalently gi > 0), then limxi →0 fg(x) = 0
and so limx˜i ↓0 fg(x˜)/x˜i precisely is the i’th partial (upper) derivative of fg , ∂+i fg(x)
when xi = 0. Hence wig(x) = Pig∂+i fg(x) when xi = 0.
Given the above observations, the following condition is sufficient to ensure Lips-
chitz continuity of F : m → Rm .
Assumption 1 The matching rule f satisfies the following:
(i) f is Lipschitz continuous
(ii) if x ∈ bdi (m), then ∂+i fg(x) exist for all (i, g) ∈ M × G such that gi > 0.
Note that the differentiability requirement is satisfied trivially if the matching rule is
differentiable at the boundary of m .
In this way, through condition (4), a payoff matrix A and a matching rule f define
the payoff function F . We identify the population game induced by A and f by this
payoff function and write F A, f to refer explicitly to the payoff matrix and matching
rule. A Nash equilibrium of the induced game is defined as usual (Sandholm 2010, p.
24).
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium) A Nash equilibrium of the induced population game
F A, f is a population state x∗ ∈ m such that for i ∈ M with x∗i > 0:
F A, fi (x
∗) ≥ F A, fk (x∗) for all k ∈ M. (5)
Following standard arguments, continuity of F A, f implies that a Nash equilibrium
exists. Therefore, a population game under a matching rule f that satisfies Assump-
tion 1 is guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium.
In the evolutionary game theory literature, the key equilibrium refinement concept
is that of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy or State (ESS). ESS is usually defined in
games with uniformly random matching and in the special case when n = 2 (see for
example Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, p. 63). Since matching can be non-uniformly
random, there are possible nonlinearities introduced into the payoff function through
the matching rule f . Thus, the appropriate definition of an ESS needs to have the
local character of Pohley and Thomas (1983). We formulate the definition by means
of a uniform invasion barrier (see e.g. Sandholm 2010, p. 276) as in this manner what
“local” means is made clear.
Definition 3 (ESS) An ESS of the induced population game F A, f is a population state
xˆ ∈ m for which there exists ε¯ > 0 such that for all y ∈ m\{xˆ} and all ε ∈ (0, ε¯)
xˆ · F A, f (εy + (1 − ε)xˆ) > y · F A, f (εy + (1 − ε)xˆ). (6)
Assumption 1 ensures that F A, f is continuous. Therefore, if it holds the standard
result that an ESS is a refinement of Nash equilibrium applies.
Proposition 1 Let F A, f be the population game induced by payoff matrix A and
matching rule f . Let also f satisfy Assumption 1. Then any ESS of F A, f is a Nash
equilibrium.
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Proof By way of contradiction, assume that some xˆ ∈ m is an ESS but not a
Nash equilibrium. Then, there exists some y ∈ m such that (y − xˆ) · F A, f
(
xˆ
)
>
0. But from the definition of an ESS, there exists some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that (y −
xˆ) · F A, f (εy + (1 − ε) xˆ) < 0 for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯). As explained before, the two
conditions of Assumption 1, imply continuity of F A, f . By continuity therefore (y −
xˆ) · F A, f (xˆ) ≤ 0, a contradiction. 
unionsq
2.3 Examples of matching rules
Before turning to describe the dynamical system that will determine the evolution of
the population in our model, we provide some examples of matching rules. Note that
all of the examples satisfy Assumption 1.
2.3.1 Complete segregation
Different strategies do not mix. All individuals are allocated into groups with only
individuals of the same type and thus all groups contain a single type of individuals each
(n individuals that follow the same strategy). The group types that have n individuals
of the same type get a non-negative frequency whereas all other kinds of groups get
a frequency of zero. Due to the consistency requirements for matching rules, we get
that the group type that contains n i-types should get a frequency of xi . So, formally,
the matching rule for complete segregation is the following.
fg (x) = xi , if Pig = 1
fg(x) = 0, otherwise. (7)
For example, say Say n = 2 and m = 2 with the two strategies being C and D.
There are three group types: {CC}, {C D} and {DD}. The matching rule for complete
segregation takes the form
f{CC}(xC , xD) = xC f{C D}(xC , xD) = 0 f{DD}(xC , xD) = xD .
2.3.2 Uniformly random matching
Let us define an opponent profile to be a collection ν = (ν j ∈ N) j∈M such that∑m
j=1 ν j = n − 1. We denote the set of all opponent profiles by O. The set O consists
of all possible combinations of types of other individuals that an individual can find
in the group in which he is matched.
A matching rule f is going to be called uniformly random if the ex-ante probability
of an individual (conditional on her type) to face an opponent profile ν is independent
of the individual’s type, for all ν ∈ O. If this is the case, then the frequencies of group
types will follow a multinomial distribution (see for example Lefebvre 2007, p. 22):
fg(x) = n!∏m
j=1 g j !
m∏
j=1
x
g j
j . (8)
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One can easily verify that expression (8) indeed describes a matching rule i.e. that it
satisfies (1). To show that the property described above holds for the matching rule of
equation (8), first observe that an opponent profile ν ∈ O along with an individual-type
i ∈ M uniquely define a group-type. Since g j is the number of j-type individuals in
a g-type group, the group-type created by adding an i-type individual to an opponent
profile ν will have the following structure:8
g j =
{
ν j + 1 if j = i
ν j if j ∈ M\{i} . (9)
So, the probability of an i-type individual to end up in a group where she faces the
opponent profile ν is the same as the probability of an i-type individual to end up in a
group with a structure given by (9).
Now recall that the probability of an i-type individual (conditional on her type) to
end up in a g-type group is given by wig(x) of equation (3). Using this formula for
the matching rule of equation (8) yields
wig(x) = Pig
xi
fg(x) = gi
nxi
n!
∏m
j=1 g j !
m∏
j=1
x
g j
j =
x
gi −1
i
(gi − 1)!
(n − 1)!
∏
j∈M\{i} g j !
∏
j∈M\{i}
x
g j
j .
Applying this for the particular group that has the composition given by (9) and
noting that νi = gi − 1 and ν j = g j for all j = i , we get that the probability of an
i-type to face an opponent profile ν is
x
νi
i
νi !
(n − 1)!
∏
j∈M\{i} ν j !
∏
j∈M\{i}
x
ν j
j =
(n − 1)!
∏m
j=1 ν j !
m∏
j=1
x
ν j
j
which only depends on the opponent profile ν and the population state x i.e. it is
independent of the indiviudal’s type i . Therefore expression (8) describes a uniformly
random matching rule.
Notice that for m = 2, the uniformly random matching rule becomes
fg(x1, x2) = n!g1!g2! x
g1
1 x
g2
2 .
That is it boils down to the binomial distribution (see Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2002,
p. 484). And for n = 2, we get
f(2,0)(x1, x2) = x21 f(1,1)(x1, x2) = 2x1x2 f(0,2)(x1, x2) = x22 .
8 Note that the group-types that are formed by two different individual-types facing the same opponent
profile will be different.
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2.3.3 Constant index of assortativity (2 strategies)
Bergström (2003) studies 2-person prisoners’ dilemma population games by using the
“index of assortativity” which he defines as “the difference between the probability
that a C-strategist meets a C-strategist and the probability that a D-strategist meets
a C-strategist.” In terms of notation used in this paper this means that the index of
assortativity when the population state is (xC , xD) will be:
α(xC , xD)=wC{CC}(xC , xD)−wD{C D}(xC , xD)= f{CC}(xC , xD)
xC
− f{C D}(xC , xD)
2xD
.
Bergström goes on to analyze prisoners’ dilemma games under assortative matching
rules for which the index of assortativity α is constant for all values of x . As one easily
verifies, the matching rule corresponding to a constant index of assortativity α is:
f{CC}(xC , xD) = αxC + (1 − α)x2Cf{C D}(xC , xD) = 2(1 − α)xC xD
f{DD}(xC , xD) = αxD + (1 − α)x2D .
In the case of α = 0 the rule coincides with the random matching rule and in the case
of α = 1 it coincides with the complete segregation rule (for both of these statements
we need n = m = 2, i.e., two players and two strategies).
2.3.4 (Almost) constant index of dissociation
It is not possible to use the previous definition of a constant index of assortativity
rule for negative values of α—i.e. to dissociative matching—without violating the
consistency condition (1) that defines matching rules. Indeed, if such a “constant
index of dissociation” rule is imposed without any changes, the matching rule would
necessarily violate (1) when xC is close to 0 or to 1: in the former case there are not
enough C-types with whom the D-types should be matched and vice versa when xC
is close to 1.9 So, to consider a matching rule with an index of dissociation that is
constant whenever it is possible, one must “tweak” the construction slightly near the
boundary. In the matching rule we propose, we deal with that by matching as many
individuals as possible in mixed groups and the remaining individuals in homogeneous
groups. So, a matching rule with an (almost) constant index of dissociation β ∈ [0, 1]
is given by the following:
f (xC , xD) =
( f{CC}(xC , xD), f{C D}(xC , xD), f{DD}(xC , xD)
)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(0 , 2xC , 1 − 2xC ), xC ∈
[
0, β1+β
]
(
(1 + β)x2C − βxC , 2(1 + β)xC xD , (1 + β)x2D − βxD
)
, xC ∈
(
β
1+β ,
1
1+β
)
(1 − 2xD , 2xD , 0 ), xC ∈
[
1
1+β , 1
]
.
9 More specifically, this happens for xC ∈ (0, −α1−α ) ∪ ( 11−α , 1) when α ∈ [−1, 0).
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2.3.5 Constant index of assortativity (m strategies)
The constant index of assortativity rule of 2.3.3 can be extended to 2-player games with
more than two strategies (Bergström 2013) where the index α denotes the proportion
of individuals of any given type to enter a pool that consists only of individuals of
the same type (and get matched to individuals from within their pool). The remaining
proportion (1−α) enters a common pool where individuals match uniformly randomly.
This description generates the following matching rule in our formulation:
f{i i}(x) = αxi + (1 − α)x2if{i j}(x) = 2(1 − α)xi x j if j = i.
2.3.6 Constant index of uniform group formation (n players, 2 strategies)
Following a similar way of thinking as in Sect. 2.3.5, an assortative matching rule can
be extended to n-player games with two strategies/types. The rule of Eq. (10) describes
the following process: a proportion α of each of the two types enters a pool that consists
only of individuals of the same type and (uniform) n-sized groups are formed from
within these two pools. The remaining proportion (1−α) enters a common pool where
individuals are drawn to form n-sized groups uniformly randomly. This leads to the
matching rule being
f(0,n)(xC , xD) = αxD + (1 − α)xnD
f(k,n−k)(xC , xD) = (1 − α) n!k!(n−k)! xkC xn−kD for k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1
f(n,0)(xC , xD) = αxC + (1 − α)xnC .
(10)
2.4 Dynamics
Let xt ∈ m denote the population state at time t . At time t , the population is allocated
into groups according to the matching rule f , hence f (xt) ∈ γ is the resulting
frequency distribution of group types. Regardless of which group an individual of
type i ends up in, he will mechanically follow the strategy of his type (as inherited
from the parent) and fitness will be distributed accordingly. The average fitness that an
i-type individual receives is given by (4), repeated here for the reader’s convenience
and with explicit reference to the payoff matrix and matching rule:
F A, fi (x
t ) =
∑
g∈G
wig(x)Aig . (11)
The average fitness across the entire population is,
F A, f
(
xt
) =
m∑
i=1
xti F
A, f
i
(
xt
) = xt · F A, f (xt) . (12)
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All that now remains is to describe how these fitnesses determine the next gen-
eration. For this, we use the continuous-time replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker
1978) which formalizes the idea that the rate at which the proportion of i-type indi-
viduals grows is equal to the amount by which type-i average fitness (F A, fi ) exceeds
the population-wide average fitness (F A, f ).
Definition 4 The continuous-time replicator dynamic of the induced population game
F A, f is given by the equations:
x˙ ti = xti
(
F A, fi (x
t ) − F A, f (xt )
)
for i ∈ M (13)
with F A, fi and F
A, f defined in equations (11) and (12), respectively.
Definition 5 A steady state of the induced population game F A, f is a rest point of
the dynamical system (13).
Notice that as we do not assume any linearity of the matching rule f , the fitness
functions F A, fi , i = 1, . . . , m will typically be nonlinear. This is in contrast with
the linear fitness functions obtained under uniformly random matching. Different
notions of stability such as Lyapunov and asymptotic stability are defined as usual
in either case, and the associated steady states (if any) are said to be Lyapunov stable,
asymptotically stable, and so on. Since any uniform population state—i.e., any state
where all individuals are of the same type—will be a steady state, it is clear that
stability must be considered or else the model will have no predictive power.
3 Results
In this section we provide our main theoretical results. First we establish that several
well-known results from the population games literature extend to games induced by
matching rules as long as the latter are well-behaved. Secondly, we show that efficient
outcomes can always be supported as Nash equilibria of population games induced
by appropriately selected matching rules.
3.1 Dynamic stability and equilibrium
In evolutionary models with uniformly random matching, there is a close relationship
between dynamic models of the replicator type and game theoretic concepts such
as Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategies (e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund
1998, Theorem 7.2.1; Weibull 1995, Proposition 3.10).10 Given our formalization of
matching rules, similar results hold for population games induced by well-behaved
(satisfying Assumption 1) non-uniformly random matching rules. In particular (i) any
Nash equilibrium is a steady state of the replicator dynamic, (ii) any Lyapunov stable
10 For similar results under even broader classes of dynamics, see Ritzberger and Weibull (1995).
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state as well as any any limit of an interior orbit under the replicator dynamic is a Nash
equilibrium, and (iii) any evolutionarily stable strategy of F A, f is asymptotically
stable for the associated replicator dynamic.11
The next proposition shows that population games induced by the uniformly random
matching rule of Sect. 2.3.2 have the same steady states and ESS as their standard
normal-form game counterparts. In this way our concept of matching rules extends
the scope of the tools of evolutionary game theory in a consistent manner.
Proposition 2 Let F A, f be the population game induced by payoff matrix A and the
uniformly random matching rule f , given by Eq. (8). Then, the set of Nash equilibria
of F A, f coincides with the set of symmetric Nash equilibria of the underlying normal
form game A. Moreover, the set of ESS of F A, f coincides with the set of ESS of A.
Proof See Appendix B.1. 
unionsq
3.2 Matching rules and efficiency
Assortative matching has been shown to be able to explain behavioral traits such as
altruism or cooperation which cannot arise in Nash equilibrium and so cannot be
favored by natural selection if matching is uniformly random, as seen in Proposition 2
(e.g. Alger and Weibull 2013, 2016). Importantly, such departures from self-regarding
behavior may be more efficient than the outcomes under uniformly random match-
ing in the sense that the average fitness may be higher. The classical example here
is the prisoners’ dilemma where the outcome of uniformly random matching yields
lower average fitness than outcomes under assortative matching (see Sect. 4 and also
Bergström 2002). In what follows, the welfare notion that we have in mind is a util-
itarian one. Thus, efficiency will be measured by the level of average fitness in the
population.
The observation that uniformly random matching—or for that matter any other
specifically given matching rule f —may not maximize average fitness in a Nash
equilibrium x∗ also remains valid if instead of Nash equilibria we focus on ESS. Thus,
evolution under non-uniformly random matching certainly does not imply average
fitness maximization. The interesting next question therefore is whether for a fixed
underlying normal form game A there exists some matching rule under which average
fitness will be maximized at a Nash equilbrium of F A, f . When discussing this topic it
is important to understand that when f is varied, not only does the set of Nash equilibria
(and ESS and also, the set of steady states of the replicator dynamics) change—the
efficiency level F A, f (x) will also change at any given population state x . So if some
population state maximizes average fitness but is not a Nash equilibrium under some
matching rule f ′, it could be a Nash equilibrium under a different matching rule f ′′ but
no longer maximize average fitness. Any sensible discussion must therefore consider
the joint selection of a population state and matching rule as captured by the following
definition.
11 The matching rule f satisfying Assumption 1 guarantees Lipschitz continuity of the fitness functions
and makes the dynamic (13) imitative. Therefore, one can apply Proposition 5.2.1 of Sandholm (2010, p.
146) to show (i), Theorem 8.1.1 (ibid., 272) to show (ii), and Theorem 8.4.1 (ibid., 283) to show (iii).
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Definition 6 (Evolutionary Optimum) Let A be a symmetric n-player, m-strategy
normal form game. A population state x∗ ∈ m together with a matching rule f ∗ is
said to be an evolutionary optimum if
F A, f
∗
(x∗) ≥ F A, f (x) for all (x, f ) ∈ E =
{
(x, f ) : x is a steady state of F A, f
}
.
Intuitively, a population state x∗ and a matching rule f ∗ form an optimum if they
lead to maximum average fitness among all population state/matching rule combina-
tions that satisfy the steady state restriction. Note that the restriction to steady states
is entirely natural here: any population state that is not a steady state of the replica-
tor dynamics would immediately be “destroyed” by natural selection.12 Given these
definitions, we can now answer the previous question:
Proposition 3 Let (x∗, f ∗) be an evolutionary optimum. Then there exists a matching
rule h which satisfies Assumption 1, such that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium under h and
(x∗, h) is an evolutionary optimum. In particular, F A,h(x∗) = F A, f ∗(x∗).
Proof See Appendix B.2. 
unionsq
We obtain the result of Proposition 3 by constructing the matching rule h so that
types that are not in the support of x∗ are matched in homogeneous groups, away from
other types. In this way these types cannot be receiving higher fitness than the average
fitness at x∗ as (x∗, f ∗) is an evolutionary optimum.
Proposition 3 is telling us that any evolutionary optimum can be attained in the
evolutionary environment through some matching rule. That this should be so is easy
to see in simple cases. In most standard games (including some of those considered
in this paper), there is a premium on coordination/uniformity, and so what is needed
in order to reach an evolutionary optimum is a sufficiently high level of assortativity.
In games where there is a premium on agents in a group being different—e.g., due to
specialization—it will instead be a sufficiently high degree of dissociation that leads
to evolutionary optimality. It is not obvious that proposition 3 should hold in the latter
case, to say nothing of cases where neither assortative nor dissociative matching rules
do the trick.
4 Applications
In this section we apply the concepts that were developed earlier in the paper to analyze
some 2-player 2-strategy symmetric, normal form games that are frequently encoun-
tered in the literature under matching rules that have a constant index of assortativity
(see Sect. 2.3.3). Namely, we consider the Hawk-Dove (HD) game, the Stag Hunt (SH),
and the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). In all games considered, there is a “cooperative”
strategy in the sense that use of this strategy by one player increases the payoff of the
player’s opponent. Table 1 provides the names by which the two strategies are referred
12 Note in this connection that any uniform population state is a steady state (in fact, any uniform population
state is a steady state under any matching rule).
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Table 1 List of strategy names and defining conditions for the 2 × 2 games considered
Game Cooperative strategy (C) Other strategy (D) Defining conditions
HD Dove Hawk AD2 > AC1 > AC2 > AD3
SH Stag Hare AC1 > AD2 ≥ AD3 > AC2AD2 + AD3 > AC1 + AC2
PD Cooperate Defect AD2 > AC1 > AD3 > AC2
Table 2 Defining conditions for
the three PD game categories
(along with AD2 > AC1 >
AD3 > AC2)
Sub-additive AC1 + AD3 < AD2 + AC2
Linear AC1 + AD3 = AD2 + AC2
Super-additive AC1 + AD3 > AD2 + AC2
to in the literature for each of the games along with the games’ defining conditions.13
To simplify notation, we will always refer to the Cooperative strategy as C and to the
other strategy as D. More than that, we use the following numbers to index the three
possible group types: group-type 1 consists of two C-type individuals, group-type 2
is the mixed group-type and group-type 3 consists of two D-type individuals. Finally,
when calculating equilibria and steady states for the population games, we will use
x to denote the proportion of the population that follows strategy C . Example payoff
matrices of the game classes that are considered here are found in Table 3. In the
Appendix we develop a method to find Nash equilibria and ESS in 2 × 2 population
games induced by matching rules and to depict average fitness contours.
Interestingly, in the case of a constant index of assortativity rule, the payoffs from
the two strategies are such that it is as if the individuals in the population are playing
a 2×2 game with altered payoffs under uniformly random matching. This is shown in
Table 4. The reason for which this is possible with the constant index of assortativity
matching rule is because f2 is proportional to x(1 − x) (see Sect. 2.3.3) and thus the
appropriate terms in the payoff functions F A, fi conveniently cancel out. Such a simple
transformation is not possible with more complicated matching rules.
Using the transformed game of Table 4, we can characterize the Nash equilibria
and ESS of the population game using the definitions of the concepts: when α < 1 an
x ∈ (0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium iff
x (AC2 − AC1 + AD2 − AD3) = AC2 − AC1 + AC1 − AD31 − α ,
and when α = 1 any x ∈ (0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium iff AC1 = AD3. An x ∈
(0, 1) is an ESS if—together with the above condition—the following hold: α(AD2 −
13 Following Bergström (2003) we identify three cases of the PD game: those who correspond to public
goods games with (i) sub-additive, (ii) linear, and (iii) super-additive production functions. The conditions
for the three cases of PD are shown in Table 2.
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Table 3 Example payoff
matrices for the 2 × 2 games
considered
C D
(a) HD
C 10, 10 8, 18
D 18, 8 6, 6
(b) SH
C 10, 10 0, 7
D 7, 0 6, 6
(c) PD (sub-additive)
C 10, 10 5, 18
D 18, 5 6, 6
(d) PD (linear)
C 10, 10 5, 11
D 11, 5 6, 6
(e) PD (super-additive)
C 10, 10 3, 11
D 11, 3 6, 6
Table 4 The transformation of symmetric 2 × 2 normal-form games resulting from a constant index of
assortativity rule. The payoffs displayed are for the row player
C D C D
C AC1 AC2 −→ C AC1 αAC1 + (1 − α)AC2
D AD2 AD3 D αAD3 + (1 − α)AD2 AD3
AD3) < AD2 − AC1 and α(AC1 − AC2) > AD3 − AC2.14 Moreover, x = 0 is a Nash
equilibrium iff α(AC1 − AC2) ≤ AD3 − AC2, whereas x = 1 is a Nash equilibrium iff
α(AD2 − AD3) ≥ AD2 − AC1. Each of the two uniform population states is an ESS
if the respective inequality holds strictly.
Our analysis shows that the 2 × 2 games considered have fundamentally different
comparative statics with respect to the assortativity parameter α depending on whether
AD2+AC2 is greater or less than AC1+AD3. In particular, if AD2+AC2 > AC1+AD3
(which is the case in the HD and sub-additive PD), then for any value of α the induced
population game F A, f has a unique Nash equilibrium which is also an ESS. On the
contrary, for normal-form games with AD2 + AC2 < AC1 + AD3 (which is the case
in the SH and super-additive PD) there are regions of the assortativity parameter α for
which the replicator dynamic equation is bistable and the induced population game
has three Nash equilibria: one ESS at x = 1 where the whole population follows
the cooperative strategy (C), one ESS at x = 0 where the whole population follows
the other strategy (D) and a Nash equilibrium which is not an ESS where part of
14 One can confirm that a necessary condition for the two inequalities to hold jointly—and, thus, for an
interior ESS to exist—is that AC2 + AD2 > AC1 + AD3.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Fig. 1 Nash equilibria as a function of the index of assortativity for the games of Table 3
the population follows C and another part of the population follows D (polymorphic
equilibrium). Finally, the case where AD2 + AC2 = AC1 + AD3 (linear PD) is a
transitional case and includes a continuum of neutrally stable Nash equilibria for a
particular value of the assortativity parameter. These results can be seen in Fig. 1.
Risk Dominance In the case of normal form games with AD2 + AC2 < AC1 + AD3,
there is a value of the index of assortativity α∗ = ((AD2 − AC2) − (AC1 − AD3)) /
((AD2 − AC2) + (AC1 − AD3)) for which the basin of attraction of the ESS at x = 1
is greater than that of the ESS at x = 0 iff α ∈ (α∗, 1]. We can interpret that as
follows. Assume that individuals in the population do not know whether each of the
other players is going to play C or D and so, using the principle of insufficient reason,
they ascribe equal probabilities (equal to 0.5 each) to each other player following C
and D.15 Then, if α ∈ (α∗, 1] the expected payoff for a player following C is higher
than his expected payoff when he follows D and so, given the aforementioned beliefs,
it is a best response for all of them to follow C , leading to the population state being
x = 1. Conversely when α ∈ [0, α∗).
So, in the terms described above, we can have a notion of risk dominance in the
induced population game. Of course, as in both the SH and the super-additive PD it is
true that AD2 + AD3 > AC1 + AC2, when α = 0 (uniformly random matching) the
risk dominant equilibrium is the one where the whole population follows D (x = 0).
Efficiency When faced with a normal-form game payoff matrix, one might ask what the
population state x∗ that maximizes average fitness (under uniformly random matching)
is.16 One might then try to achieve efficiency by naïvely implementing x∗ as a Nash
15 See also Carlsson and Van Damme (1993).
16 Notice that for our 2×2 games this average fitness will coincide with the expected payoff in the normal
form game when both players use that same strategy.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Fig. 2 Equilibrium average fitness and normal form game payoff for the games of Table 3
equilibrium through the application of an appropriate matching rule. The problem in
the above is that if the rule that needs to be used is non-uniformly random, then the
average fitness in equilibrium will (generically) differ from the one calculated in the
beginning and may also no longer be optimal (maximum). We make such efficiency
comparisons for our selected classes of games in what follows.
In order to conduct efficiency analysis, we use the methodology described in sec-
tion A.3 of the Appendix. The comparison between Nash equilibrium average fitness
in the induced game F A, f and expected payoff in the normal form game when both
players use the same strategy for our class of games is shown in Fig. 2. Notice that in
the HD and SH cases the equilibrium efficiency curve is not defined for some values
of x as these states cannot be attained as Nash equilibria of F A, f under any matching
rule f .
In all our classes of games, the level of Nash equilibrium average fitness is strictly
increasing with the proportion of C-individuals in the population and thus, Nash
equilibrium efficiency is achieved when the Nash equilibrium is x = 1 i.e. when the
whole population follows C . Now, in the case where AC2 + AD2 ≤ 2AC1 (which is
true for all SH, super-additive PD, and linear PD games), maximum Nash equilibrium
average fitness coincides with the maximum expected payoff players using symmetric
strategies can get in the normal form game (which is attained when both players play C
with certainty). In the case where AC2 + AD2 > 2AC1 (which can only hold for some
HD and some sub-additive PD games), the normal form game maximum expected
payoff (under symmetric strategy profiles) is obtained if both players play C with
probability p∗C = AC2+AD2−2AD32(AC2+AD2−AC1−AD3) .17 However, when a matching rule that makes
x = p∗C an equilibrium is implemented, equilibrium average fitness is reduced below
17 Note that PD games of this class are also referred to as Missing Hero Dilemmas in the literature (e.g.
Nax and Rigos 2016; Diekmann and Przepiorka 2015).
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AC1. This is because the proportion of C D pairs—which are efficient in the utilitarian
sense—is reduced in favor of more DD and CC pairs which are not as efficient.
Discussion
Despite some similarity between the two settings, our results differ from those of Alger
and Weibull (2013) due to the different nature of the strategy sets and, conseqently,
of the assortativity considered.18 In particular, even in their “finite games” example,
where they analyze 2×2 normal-form games, Alger and Weibull (2013) take the set of
mixed strategies (an infinite, convex set) as the relevant strategy set. An evolutionarily
stable strategy in their model is a mixed strategy s ∈ m such that if the whole
population uses s, it cannot be invaded by a (uniform) population using any other
mixed strategy s′ ∈ m . The index of assortativity is then defined based on differences
of probabilities of residents and invaders to encounter a resident i.e. between mixed
strategies. In our model, assortativity is between pure strategies, that are the only ones
available to the population. Assortative matching between mixed strategies makes
payoffs to the two types nonlinear in the population state. Such nonlinearities cannot
be captured in our pure-strategy case (as is shown in Table 4).
One could think that we could recover the results of Alger and Weibull (2013)
if the resident population was considered to be using a pure strategy, say C . Even
in this case our results differ though, since Alger and Weibull (2013) assume that
the population withstands invasion from strategies arbitrarily close to the resident
one whereas in our setting, the only possible invading strategy would be the “other”
strategy D. Of course, since they only consider stability of homogeneous populations,
any polymorphic equilibrium where both strategies are present in the population (see
for example the HD game above) is excluded in Alger and Weibull (2013) as that
would automatically render both strategies evolutionarily unstable.
5 Conclusion
This paper had two main purposes. Firstly, to extend the existing machinery of evo-
lutionary game theory to include non-uniformly random matching under arbitrary
matching rules and group sizes; and secondly, to discuss the relationship between
matching and equilibrium efficiency. In Sect. 3.1 we showed that several results that
hold for Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies under uniformly random
matching extend to our setting (as one would expect from the literature on population
games). As for efficiency, our main result (Proposition 3) showed that any evolution-
ary optimum will be a Nash equilibrium of the induced population game under some
matching rule.
Often, matching is a geographical phenomenon: think of viruses, neighborhood imi-
tation amongst humans, or trait-group/haystack-model-type of interactions (Cooper
and Wallace 2004; Maynard Smith 1964; Wilson 1977). But when matching rules
18 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that different results are obtained in the two settings.
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correspond to institutions or conventions, not explaining how they come about misses
half the story. A clear weakness of most existing models—including the results in this
paper—is in this connection that the matching rules are taken as given. An obvious
topic for future research would be to model the evolution of the matching rules (i.e.,
to endogenize them). An example of such an attempt is Nax and Rigos (2016) who
endogenize the matching process via allowing individuals to vote for either more or
less assortativity. Another direction could involve monitoring: If individuals gain an
advantage by increasing their ability to monitor (by increasing their intelligence and
memory), we can see how matching rules will over time evolve to be less and less
random (typically more and more assortative). This then would be a true endogenous
description of matching (institutions, conventions). The simplicity of the framework
presented in this paper should definitely put such theories of evolving matching rules
within reach.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
A Finding all Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 induced games
In this section we provide a tool that makes it easy for one to find and visualize
Nash equilibria and ESS of induced population games in the 2-player, 2-strategy case.
Using our method, we can easily identify Nash equilibria of such games by looking
for intersections between two lines: one that depends on the payoffs (the equilibrium
curve) and one that depends on the matching rule in effect (the matching rule curve).
An example is shown in Fig. 3; the Nash equilibrium is at the intersection of the two
lines.
In what follows, we analyze games that have a payoff bimatrix of the general
form presented in Table 5. For consistency with the analysis of Sect. 4, we will call
Fig. 3 Example of finding the
Nash equilibrium of an induced
game
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Table 5 The general form of a
2 × 2 game (AC1 ≥ AD3) C D
C AC1, AC1 AC2, AD2
D AD2, AC2 AD3, AD3
the two strategies C and D and we will use numbers to index the groups such that
group-type 1 contains two C-type individuals, group-type 2 contains a C-type and a
D-type individual and group-type 3 contains two D-type individuals. Without loss of
generality, we will assume that AC1 ≥ AD3.
A.1 The matching rule curve
A matching rule for the 2×2 case, will be of the form f (x) = ( f1(xC , xD), f2(xC , xD),
f3(xC , xD)). Now notice that as f needs to satisfy (1) (two linearly independent equa-
tions in our example of 2 strategies), it can be easily described by only defining one
of the three coordinates fg . We pick the coordinate f2—that expresses the extent
to which the two strategies get mixed with one another — to describe the matching
rule. Moreover, as there are only two strategies available, the population state can
be summarized by the proportion of individuals using strategy C as the remaining
individuals are clearly using strategy D. We will use x to denote this proportion and
thus to express the population state.19 So any matching rule will be described by a
function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Under the requirement (1), the three coordinates of f
can be calculated to be:
f1(x) = x − 12φ(x) f2(x) = φ(x) f3(x) = 1 − x −
1
2
φ(x). (14)
More than that, the conditions fg(x) ≥ 0, g = 1, 2, 3 must be satisfied for all x ∈
[0, 1]. From these, we get that the values φ(x) can take are restricted by
0 ≤ φ(x) ≤ 2x for x ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
and 0 ≤ φ(x) ≤ 2(1 − x) for x ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
.
(15)
It is now possible to draw diagrams that show what matching rules look like. Exam-
ples of graphs of matching rules are given in Fig. 4. A matching rule is summarized
by a line that begins at (0,0), assumes values “within” the triangle bounded by (15)
and ends at (1,0).
Under this formalization, the random matching rule will be given by
φ(x) = 2x(1 − x)
whereas the complete segregation rule is simply
φ(x) = 0.
19 Obviously, xC = x and xD = 1 − x .
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Fig. 4 Examples of matching
rule curves
Another example would be the constant index of assortativity rule (Bergström 2003)
which can be summarized by
φ(x) = 2(1 − α)x(1 − x)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the index of assortativity.
A.2 The equilibrium curve
Under a matching rule f , a population state x∗ ∈ (0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium of F A, f
iff
F A, fC (x
∗) = F A, fD (x∗) ⇔
[(AD2 − AD3)x∗ + (AC1 − AC2)(1 − x∗)]φ(x∗) = 2(AC1 − AD3)x∗(1 − x∗).
(16)
Assuming that φ is differentiable at 0 and at 1, we get the following conditions for
boundary Nash equilibiria. For x = 0 to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case
that
F A, fC (0) ≤ F A, fD (0) ⇒ (AC1 − AC2)
∂φ
∂x
(0) ≥ 2(AC1 − AD3) (17)
and for x = 1 to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that
F A, fC (1) ≥ F A, fD (1) ⇒ (AD3 − AD2)
∂φ
∂x
(1) ≤ 2(AC1 − AD3). (18)
Now, provided that there is actually some strategic interaction occurring between
the two players, i.e. either AD2 = AD3 or AC1 = AC2 (or both), then from condition
(16) we get two cases:
• If AC1 = AD3, then x ∈ (0, 1) will be a Nash equilibrium iff φ(x) = E(x) where
E : [0, 1] → R is defined by
E(x) = 2(AC1 − AD3)x(1 − x)
(AD2 − AD3)x + (AC1 − AC2)(1 − x) . (19)
123
728 M. K. Jensen, A. Rigos
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5 Equilibrium curves for our classes of games
We will call the graph of function E the equilibrium curve of the game.
• In the case where AC1 = AD3, then the condition for x ∈ (0, 1) to be a Nash
equilibrium is
φ(x) = 0 or x = AC2 − AC1
AD2 − AD3 + AC2 − AC1 . (20)
Condition (20) says that any population state for which C-type and D-type indi-
viduals do not mix will be a Nash equilibrium (obviously, as no strategy gets
an advantage over the other) and, more importantly, that the population state
AC2−AC1
AD2−AD3+AC2−AC1 will be a Nash equilibrium for all matching rules (as long
as this value is within the boundaries (0, 1)).
Stability and the Equilibrium Curve If we assume that the matching rule is C1 as
is done for some of results stated in Sect. 3.1, then it can be easily verified that a
population state x will be an ESS iff
φ(x) = E(x) and ∂φ
∂x
(x) >
∂E
∂x
(x). (21)
As examples of the equilibrium curve analysis for our 2 × 2 games, we provide
Fig. 5 that contains equilibrium curve examples for the classes of games analyzed in
the main text.
Using the above analysis in conjunction with diagrams like the one in Fig. 4 can help
us identify Nash equilibria and ESS very easily. All one has to do is to plot φ (which
summarizes the matching rule) and the equilibrium curve E (which summarizes the
normal form game) on the same diagram. If the two lines meet at an interior population
state x , then x is a Nash equilibrium. If along with that the equilibrium curve is above
the matching rule curve to the left of x and below it to the right of x , then x is an ESS
as well. Finally, for the uniform population states (x = 0 and x = 1), one can say that
in order for one these to be a Nash equilibrium (ESS), then it has to be that the slope
of the matching rule curve is greater than or equal to (greater than) the slope of the
equilibrium curve at that population state. The Nash equilibrium-finding process for
our classes of games is depicted in Fig. 6.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Fig. 6 The equilibrium-finding process for our classes of games
A.3 Efficiency in 2 × 2 games
In the case of 2×2 games, by using the formalization introduced above, we can make
equilibrium efficiency considerations. We are interested in seeing how different Nash
equilibria fare in terms of efficiency. For a 2 × 2 game, efficiency at state x when the
value of the matching rule at x is φ is given by
W (x, φ) = AD3 + (AC1 − AD3)x + (AC2 + AD2 − AC1 − AD3) φ2 (22)
and as long as AC2 + AD2 = AC1 + AD3, solving for φ, we get
φ = 2(W − AD3)
AC2 + AD2 − AC1 − AD3 −
2(AC1 − AD3)x
AC2 + AD2 − AC1 − AD3 . (23)
For any value of W , the above equation gives the set of points on the (x, φ) plane that
yield an average payoff of W for the population. We will call such lines isogrowth lines
as all points on each of these lines lead to the same growth rate of the population (which
is the same as the average payoff). Drawing such lines can help us visualize what is
really happening in terms of efficiency under the various matching rules. More than
that, by combining the isogrowth lines with the equilibrium curves of different games,
we can see which matching rules lead to average fitness maximization. Isogrowth
diagrams for the classes of games analyzed in the main text are shown in Fig. 7.
Finally, using the efficiency function (22) along with the equilibrium curve (19)
we can calculate the Nash equilibrium efficiency in the induced game F A, f and then
compare that to the expected payoff of a player in the normal form game when both
players are using the same strategy. Such comparisons are carried out in Sect. 4 of the
main text.
123
730 M. K. Jensen, A. Rigos
(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Fig. 7 Isogrowth diagrams for the games of Table 3
B Omitted proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us denote by y p ∈ m the (mixed) strategy used by player p in the normal-form
game A and by x−p ∈ m the strategy used in the normal-form game A by all player
p’s opponents. Let also Up(y p|x−p) be the expected payoff of player p in the normal-
form game when he/she is using strategy y p and all of his/her opponents use strategy
x−p ∈ m . Since A is symmetric, we have that Up(y|x) = Pq(y|x) for all players
p, q. So we can write U (y|x) to express the expected payoff in the normal-form game
of any player using strategy y when all his opponents use strategy x .
A symmetric Nash equilibrium of game A is a strategy x∗ ∈ m such that
U (x∗|x∗) ≥ U (y|x∗) for all y ∈ m .
On the other hand, a strategy x∗ will be a Nash equilibrium in the induced game
F A, f iff

(x∗, x∗) ≥ 
(y, x∗) for all y ∈ m .
In the above 
(y, x∗) = y · F A, f (x∗) expresses the expected payoff to an individual
using strategy y while the rest of the population is using strategy x∗. In order to prove
the proposition, all we need to show is that

(y, x) = U (y|x) for all y ∈ m (24)
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under the uniformly random matching rule. If we let ei be the probability vector that
corresponds to pure strategy i , then (24) boils down to
F A, fi (x) = U (ei |x) for all i ∈ M. (25)
Calculating F A, fi (x). Let us denote by M
g
−i the set of strategies other than i rep-
resented in group-type g, by 1i the set of all group-types that contain exactly one
individual of type i , and by i the set of group-types that contain at least one individ-
ual of type i . Formally Mg−i =
{
k ∈ M\ {i} : Pig > 0
}
, 1i = {g ∈ G : nig = 1}, and
i = {g ∈ G : Pig > 0}. Calculating F A, fi (x) under the uniformly random matching
rule yields
F A, fi (x) =
∑
g∈i
(n − 1)!xnig−1i
(nig − 1)!
∏
j∈Mg−i
x
n jg
j
n jg! Aig for x ∈ m\bdi (m) (26)
and
F A, fi (x) =
∑
g∈1i
(n − 1)!
∏
j∈Mg−i
x
n jg
j
n jg! Aig for x ∈ bdi (m). (27)
Calculating U (ei |x). In general, in the normal-form game A, all players use mixed
strategies i.e. a randomization over the set of pure strategies M . We will denote the
pure strategy (action) a player p ends up using after the randomization process has
taken place—i.e. the realization of player p’s mixed strategy—as s p. The probability
of a player ending up in a situation where his/her opponents follow (pure) strategies
s−p ∈ Mn−1 with s−p = (s1, . . . , s p−1, s p+1, . . . , sn) will be denoted by π(s−p).
When all player p’s opponents use the same strategy x , those probabilities can be
calculated to be:
π(s−p) =
m∏
j=1
(
x j
)ν j (s−p)
where ν j (s−p) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1} is the number of player p’s opponents using strategy
j in realized profile s−p.
Let us fix player p’s strategy (realization) to be s p = i . Since the game A is
symmetric, the payoff to player p will not depend on the exact ordering in s−p but
on the vector ν(s−p) = (ν1(s−p), . . . , νm(s−p)
)
. This means that different s−ps with
the same ν(s−p) will yield the same payoff for player p. Let us use κ to index the
different ν. Abusing notation, we can calculate the probability of a specific νκ to occur
to be
π(νκ) = (n − 1)!∏m
j=1 νκj !
m∏
j=1
(
x j
)νκj . (28)
As player p is using strategy j , if he ends up in a situation where his opponents’
realizations are κ , it is as if he ends up in a group of type g where n jg = νκj for j = i
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and nig = νκi + 1. Of course, for this group-type Pig > 0 will hold and we will write
g = i  κ and read: “g is the group-type that we get if we add an individual who uses
strategy i to a set of opponents whose realizations are κ .” Notice that the probabilities
in (28) are independent of player p’s choice of strategy. So, the probability of player
p ending up in situation g conditional on him using strategy i will be the same as the
probability realization κ occurring. Using the g- rather than the κ- indexing, we can
rewrite (28) (abusing the notation once again) as
π(g|i) = π(i  κ|i) = π(νκ) = (n − 1)!x
nig−1
i
(nig − 1)!
∏
j∈Mg−i
(
x j
)n jg
n jg! .
Now, in each of these cases g, player p gets a payoff of Aig and his expected payoff is
U (ei |x) =
∑
g∈i
π(g|i)Aig =
∑
g∈i
(n − 1)!xnig−1i
(nig − 1)!
∏
j∈Mg−i
(
x j
)n jg
n jg! Aig. (29)
In the special case where x ∈ bdi (m), player p can be sure that he is the only one
using strategy i and thus, the only groups that get positive probability are the ones in
1i which have nig = 1. So his/her expected payoff is:
U (ei |x) =
∑
g∈1i
p(g|i)Aig =
∑
g∈1i
(n − 1)!
∏
j∈Mg−i
(
x j
)n jg
n jg! Aig. (30)
By comparing Eqs. (26)–(29) and Eqs. (27)–(30), we can see that
F A, fi (x) = U (ei |x)
and as we showed that for an arbitrary i , it holds for all i ∈ M . 
unionsq
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let Mg = {i ∈ M : gi > 0} and let us define the following sets of group types:
E (x∗) = {g ∈ G : x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ Mg}
[M] = {g ∈ G : Mg = {i} for some i ∈ M}
E (x∗) consists of the group types that contain only individuals of types that are present
in the population state x∗. E ′(x∗) will denote its complement i.e. group types that
contain at least one individual of one of the types that are not present at x∗. [M]
consists of the groups types that contain only one type of individuals. We will denote
the group type that contains only individuals of type i by [i]. Now we can separate all
group types in the following four categories:
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• S P(x∗) = E (x∗) ∩ [M] is the set of all group types that contain a single type of
individuals that are present at x∗.
• S A(x∗) = E ′(x∗) ∩ [M] is the set of all group types that contain a single type of
individuals that are absent at x∗.
• M P(x∗) = E (x∗)\[M] is the set of all group types that contain more than one
types of individuals that are present at x∗.
• M A(x∗) = E ′(x∗)\[M] is the set of all group types that contain more than one
types of individuals and at least one of them is absent at x∗.
Let us define for any x ∈ m the following:
μ = arg mini∈{ j∈M :x∗j >0}
xi
x∗i
breaking ties for the smallest i ∈ M that satisfies the condition. We construct h as
follows:
• For all g ∈ M A(x∗) we define hg(x) = 0.
• For all g ∈ S A(x∗) if g = [i], we define hg(x) = xi .
• For all g ∈ M P(x∗) we define hg(x) = xμx∗μ f ∗g (x∗).
• For all g ∈ S P(x∗) if g = [i], we define hg(x) = xμx∗μ f ∗g (x∗) + xi −
xμ
x∗μ
x∗i .
It is easy to check that h is a matching rule as it satisfies Definition 1. More than that,
it is also easy to see that h(x∗) = f (x∗) and so (x∗, h) is an evolutionary optimum.
All we have to do is to show that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of F A, f .
Now let us define A∗ = max(x, f )∈E F A, f (x). As (x∗, h) is an evolutionary opti-
mum, it has to be that x∗ is a steady state of the replicator dynamics under h. So:
1. For all i ∈ M with x∗i > 0 it has to be that F A,h(x∗) = A∗ which is ensured by
the fact that h(x∗) = f (x∗) and
2. there is no restriction for i ∈ M with x∗i = 0.
For x∗ to be a Nash equilibrium it must hold that:
x∗ · F A,h(x∗) ≥ y · F A,h(x∗) for all y ∈ m .
Notice that from point 1 above, if x∗ ∈ int (m), it is a Nash equilibrium as
y · F A, fh (x∗) = A∗ for all y ∈ m and the proposition holds.
If x∗ ∈ bd(m), then all we need to do is show that F A,hi (x∗) ≤ A∗ for all i with
x∗i = 0. By definition
F A,hi (x
∗) =
∑
g∈i
nig
n
∂+i hg(x
∗)Aig = ∂+i h[i](x∗)Ai[i] +
∑
g∈M A∩i
nig
n
∂+i hg(x
∗)Aig = Ai[i].
Finally, notice that under any matching rule the states ei = (0, . . . , 0 , 1,︸︷︷︸
i-th
0, . . . , 0)
are steady states and the payoff of all individuals on these states is simply: F A,h(ei ) =
Ai[i]. But as (x∗, h) is an evolutionary optimum, we know that Ai[i] ≤ A∗ for all
i ∈ M . So, F A,hi (x∗) ≤ A∗ for all i ∈ M . 
unionsq
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